'At present, the UK uses the 'first past the post' system to elect MPs to the House of

Commons. Should the 'alternative vote' system be used instead?'
In the event, when the vote took place on May 5th, the referendum proposal was decisively rejected-32 per cent of the voters supported a change in the electoral system and 68 per cent opposed it, with a turnout of 42 per cent (Electoral Commission, 2011) .
The purpose of this paper is to explain why voters made the choices that they did in the referendum. The paper utilises four alternative theoretical models to explain individual voting behaviour. We designate them as the 'cost-benefit', 'cognitive engagement', 'heuristics' and 'mobilisation' models, and they are described below. The models are tested using data from the AV Referendum Study conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study 1 (BES). The paper begins with a theoretical discussion based on previous research, paying particular attention to explanations of why people vote in favour or against referendum propositions. The next section discusses the measurement of predictor variables specified in the four models. Then, we test the models using a multivariate analysis of referendum voting, and present data on public reactions to how the rival referendum campaigns were conducted. The conclusion discusses implications of the referendum for possible future reforms of the British political system.
Theoretical Perspectives
Referendums have been a topic of interest to political scientists for many years, and there are several overview volumes of research in the field (e.g., Butler and Ranney, 1994; Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; LeDuc, 2003; de Vrees, 2007) .
Alongside these collections are a number of case studies of particular referendums which have been held in different countries at different points of time (e.g., Clarke and Kornberg, 1994; Vowles, 1995; Blais et al., 1996; Marcussen and Zolner, 2001; LeDuc, 2005) . One important topic considered is why referendums take place. The dominant explanation sees referendums as the product of an elite-level game conducted by rational actors, i.e., party strategists and leaders whose aim is to maximise their legislative representation (Boix, 1999; Benoit, 2004) . Although interesting, these accounts tend to neglect the role of the voters who are treated largely as spectators in the elite-level contests.
However, it is not difficult to conceive of ways in which voters might get involved in such games as players who demand electoral or constitutional reforms. In a rational choice account voters will support a change in the political system if the benefits, as they see them,
outweighed the costs of reform. Accordingly, the first of theoretical explanation we consider, the 'cost-benefit' model, takes such an approach to explaining why people voted to support or oppose the proposed change in the UK electoral system. Put simply, voters who opted to change to AV did so because they judged that the benefits of the new system outweighed its costs.
Rational choice accounts of the vote have been criticized because they make very strong assumptions about voters' cognitive capacities and decision-making abilities (e.g., Conlisk, 1996; Green and Shapiro, 1996) . In this regard, a large number of survey respondents said that they did not understand the AV system and did not know how they were going to vote in the AV referendum. Regarding the latter, Figure 1A shows trends in vote intentions from January to early May 2011 using data from published public opinion polls and BES monthly surveys. In January about a third of the respondents said that they did not know if they supported or opposed a change in the electoral system. The size of the 'don't know' group declined over time but it was still running at about a fifth of the electorate two weeks before the balloting. This pattern is echoed in Figure 1B which displays data from the BES AV Referendum Study panel survey (described below) to track daily movements in support/opposition to AV in the month before the vote. This figure indicates that in early April between one-fifth and one-quarter of the respondents were uncertain about what they would do, and it was only in the last fortnight of the campaign that the number of 'don't knows' fell below 15 per cent as the number intending to vote No surged upward.
( Figure 1 about here)
Evidence concerning voters' levels of knowledge about the AV electoral system and politics more generally is also relevant. In this regard, a majority (51 per cent) of respondents in a BPIX survey conducted just over a week before the referendum said that they only partially understood AV or did not understand it at all 2 . Such ignorance or indifference should prompt abstention according to a rational choice explanation of participation (Downs, 1957; Whiteley, 1995) . However, as Figure 2 documents, sizable minorities of people with very low levels of political knowledge nonetheless voted in support of a change in the electoral system 3 . Taken together, these survey data suggest that it is useful to consider other explanations of the vote in addition to a rational choice account.
(Figure 2 about here)
A second theoretical approach explains referendum voting with reference to people's cognitive engagement with politics (Norris, 2000; Clarke et al., , 2009 Dalton, 2008) .
The cognitive engagement model claims that individuals participate if they have the ability and motivation to do so. Levels of knowledge and engagement with the political process are likely to be important factors in explaining involvement. Thus, if individuals are highly educated and knowledgeable they are likely to have the ability to participate in the sense of understanding how politics works and what it does to resolve societal conflicts. Equally, if people are interested in politics in general or in electoral reform in particular, then they are likely to have the motivation to vote in the referendum.
The cognitive engagement model has implications for how people voted in the referendum. Clearly, if individuals are not engaged with the debate over reform or do not understand the proposed system, then they are less likely to cast a ballot, although unlike in a rational choice account there is no presumption that they will always abstain. But, there is another effect at work too arising from the model. Evidence from a number of referendums in different countries suggests that there is a status quo bias, i.e., a tendency for people to vote against any change called for in a referendum (Nadeau, Martin and Blais, 1999; LeDuc, 2003; Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart, 2004) 4 . If people are not politically engaged and have little understanding of a proposed change, but nonetheless feel that they have a duty to vote, an easy solution to their choice problem is to support the status quo. This conjecture is consistent with research in experimental economics shows that individuals tend to be risk averse-weighing perceived costs more heavily than possible benefits when faced with a choice, the consequences of which are uncertain (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler 1994) . In the present context, the implication is that political engagement and knowledge should encourage individuals to vote Yes and disengagement should encourage the opposite response. So a prediction from the cognitive engagement model is that knowledgeable and engaged individuals will have a tendency to support a change to the electoral system and, accordingly, will vote in favour of AV.
The heuristics model complements the cognitive engagement model. In this case the idea is that when faced with uncertainty and complexity in decision-making, individuals use heuristics or 'rules of thumb' as cues which simply their choices. If a person is unsure of what to do in the referendum, an alternative strategy to just saying no would be to look for guidance from a trusted source such as a political party or a party leader (e.g., Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991) . importance has been documented in numerous studies (e.g., Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Clarke et al., , 2009 ).
Such heuristics traditionally have been seen as imperfect alternatives to full information processing of the type which would take place if individuals had the time and resources to concentrate fully on the problem. In this view, the classical decision-making model is optimal and heuristics represent a deviation from this 'gold standard' (see, e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000) . However, recent research has shown that 'fast and frugal heuristics' can be as or more effective than full information processing in many real-world decision-making situations (Gigerenzer, 2008 ; see also Conlisk, 1996) . This is because in reality decision-making is either too complex or too slow for effective choices to be made using classical utility maximization 5 . In the context of a national referendum campaign where political stakes are high and consequences of alternative outcomes are uncertain, it makes sense for voters to take advice from individuals and organisations they know and trust, such as political leaders and political parties.
The fourth theoretical perspective, the mobilisation model, captures the impact of campaigning on voting in the referendum. There is now an extensive literature showing that campaigning has a significant impact on turnout and party choice in general elections (e.g., Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Pattie, Fieldhouse and Johnston, 1995; Green and Gerber, 2004 ).
Similar to a general election, the AV referendum was characterized by considerable 
Measuring Predictor Variables
The data used to test the models presented above were gathered in a two-wave panel ( Table 1 about Table 1 10 . These data show that the survey respondents are somewhat ambiguous about the advantages of AV with about 40 per cent believing that it is fairer and about the same proportion thinking the opposite. Similar ambiguity extends to the idea that AV gives too much influence to small parties and also to the argument that the results of AV elections more accurately represent public opinion. Interestingly, the only statement eliciting majority agreement (56 per cent) is that the first-past-the-post system enhances effective attribution of responsibility to political parties.
An exploratory factor analysis of these variables yielded a single factor which explains 58.1 per cent of the item variance. Factor scores from this analysis are used to measure opinion about the relative merits of the rival electoral systems. The several variables in the factor analysis are coded so that a high factor score indicates a favourable opinion towards AV in comparison with FPTP. Respondents with higher factor scores see relatively more benefits and fewer costs associated with a change in the electoral system.
Regarding constitutional change more generally, the manifestos of all three major parties gave considerable attention to this topic during the 2010 general election. This was largely a response to the widely publicized MPs' expenses scandal, which exercised press and public alike and drew attention to the issue of constitutional reform. The responses (see Table 2 ) reveal widespread support for an elected House of Lords (61 per cent agreed), and a reduction in the number of MPs in the House of Commons to 600
(70 per cent agreed). There also was considerable agreement (58 percent) that local government should have more powers and strong opposition to the abolition of the monarchy (71 per cent disagreed). The idea of using referendums to decide important issues was popular as well, as was retention of the Church of England as a state church.
A factor analysis of these variables yielded two distinct factors which jointly explained 51.7 per cent of the item variance. The variables measuring opinion on an elected Lords, a smaller Commons, more powers to local government and more referendums to decide important issues loaded strongly on a factor which we label 'greater democracy' since a high score denotes support for all these reforms. Variables measuring opinions regarding the monarchy and Church of England load strongly on the second factor indicating, not surprisingly, that support for the monarchy is strongly associated with opposition to a change in the status of the church. We label this factor 'traditionalism' 11 . The expectation is that the democracy and traditionalism factors will have positive and negative impacts respectively, on the likelihood of casting a Yes ballot in the AV referendum.
( Table 2 about Regarding media exposure, three questions asked respondents how much attention they paid to the referendum campaign in newspapers, on television and radio, and on the internet. Answers to these questions reveal that only small numbers of people monitored the campaign closely. Specifically, 8 per cent said that they paid a 'great deal' of attention to the campaign in newspapers; 10 per cent said this about television or radio, and 8 per cent, about the internet. Larger groups-ranging from 35 per cent for the internet to 39 per cent for newspapers to 49 per cent for TV and radio-indicated that they gave 'some' attention to the campaign. A media exposure variable was constructed by cumulating these responses into an overall index scored such that a high score indicates greater exposure to news about the referendum in the media and a low score indicates the opposite.
The heuristics model focuses on party leader images and partisanship. Leader images were measured via 11-point 'like'-'dislike' scales which provide excellent summaries of the impressions people have of political leaders (Clarke et al., 2009: ch. 5) . If people trust a leader, think that he is strong, capable and listens to ordinary people then they will tend to like him, and these feelings play an important role in influencing their voting behaviour.
Both In addition to the various indicators used to specify the four explanatory models, several socio-demographic variables were included as controls in the multivariate analysis.
These variables were age, gender, and annual family income. In addition, dummy variables for residence in Scotland and Wales 12 were employed to proxy other possible factors affecting referendum voting in these countries.
Modelling Referendum Voting
Parameters in the multivariate model of voting in the AV referendum were estimated using a binomial logit regression analysis, since the dependent variable was a dummy variable with Yes voters scored 1 and No voters scored zero (Borooah, 2002) . As shown in Table 3 , the scale measuring AV's perceived costs and benefits has a large, statistically significant, impact (p < .001) on the probability of casting a Yes vote. The democracy and traditionalism scales also have highly significant impacts (p < .001) and, as expected, opposite signs. Taken together, these results indicate that calculations of the costs and benefits of AV and more general attitudes towards constitutional change significantly influenced the vote. As hypothesized, people who judged that the AV system was an improvement over FPTP or who favoured wider constitutional reforms tended to vote 'Yes'.
In contrast, those who preferred FPTP or were supporters of traditional British political institutions tended to vote 'No'.
( Table 3 about Regarding other predictors, the data in Table 3 show that most socio-demographic characteristics were insignificant. There were two exceptions. One was gender, with men being more likely to vote Yes than women (p < .001). The other was residence in Scotland;
with all other factors controlled, Scots were less likely to vote yes (p < .01) than were English (the country of residence reference category).
Since the binomial logit functional form is nonlinear, the substantive impact of statistically significant predictor variables is not readily apparent from the coefficients in Table 3 . To provide intuition about the influence of various predictors, Figure 4 shows the effect on the probability of voting Yes of increasing a given predictor from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their means. 13 It is readily apparent that the cost-benefit scale has the largest impact on the Yes vote-changing this scale from its minimum to its maximum value increases the probability of voting yes by fully .99 points (on a 0-1 probability scale). This huge shift reinforces the conjecture that perceptions of the (dis)advantages of a change in the system played a big part in explaining the results. The effects of the other two cost-benefit variables, the democracy and points, and, as expected, the effect of Labour identification was quite weak, -.05 points.
Campaign effects were very modest, with contact by Yes to Fair Votes enhancing the probability of voting Yes by .05 points, and contact by No to Av lessening it by .03 points.
Similarly small effects were associated with gender and country of residence; other things equal, men were .04 points more likely to vote Yes than were women. and residents of Scotland were -.04 points less likely to do so than were residents of England and Wales.
In summary, the multivariate analysis documents that all four models contribute to explaining why some people voted in favour of electoral reform, whereas others voted against it. The cost-benefit model stands out as highly influential. Evaluations of the advantages and disadvantages of a change in the electoral system had large effects on referendum voting decisions. Heuristics mattered too; consistent with earlier studies, leader images and partisanship had substantial effects on voting in the AV referendum. In addition, as expected, cognitively engaged people were more likely to opt for reform. Exposure to campaign contacting was influential as well, but the impact was quite modest. The overall explanatory power of the multivariate model is suggested by its very sizable McKelvey R 2 (.75), and its ability to correctly classify nearly 88 per cent of the voters correctly.
The Referendum in Retrospect
One of the most obvious aspects of the AV referendum was the dismal turnout-only 42.2 percent of the electorate bothered to cast a ballot. Not only was this figure In retrospect, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the AV referendum was a decidedly unsuccessful and unhelpful exercise in direct democracy. Despite repeated, if sometimes curious, efforts to inform people about the issues at stake in choosing an electoral system, 14 the rival campaigns failed to inform and engage much of the electorate. A majority of people did not go to the polls and, as observed, many judged the competing campaigns negatively. This judgement reflected the harshly negative tenor of widely publicized attacks launched on each other by leading Yes and No advocates. 15 Quite possibly, an important result is that the campaigns and the referendum outcome have contributed to growing sense that the British political system is seriously in need of reform. The latter outcome would be ironic; by conspicuously failing to achieve reform, the AV referendum may have heightened public appreciation of the need for it, while making it more difficult to achieve. We consider this possibility in the concluding section.
Conclusion: The Consequences of a Decisive No
The decisive outcome of the AV referendum has settled the issue and the question of electoral reform is unlikely to be re-opened for many years. If attempts are made to raise the issue again in the near future, opponents of reform will be able to say that the people have spoken and the question should no longer be up for discussion. Had the vote been closer, then supporters of a fully proportional electoral system might be able to argue that this should be on the agenda in coalition negotiations if a future general election proves as inconclusive as the last one. However, the strength of opposition to change in the electoral system manifest in the 2011 AV referendum makes this unlikely.
Another effect of the resounding rejection of electoral reform might be to inhibit attempts at other constitutional reforms such as an elected House of Lords and the devolution of power from Whitehall to local communities. If so, this is unfortunate because data presented above indicates there is substantial support for change. In addition, there is mounting evidence to suggest that the political institutions which generate support for British democracy are failing in comparison with an earlier era (Whiteley, 2011 The details of the political knowledge scale are discussed below. 4 It noteworthy that in the 1975 referendum on continued UK membership in the European Community, the yes campaign held the status quo advantage since Britain had already joined the EC. The division of the vote was: 67.2 per cent yes and 32.8 per cent no. This level of endorsement of the status quo was virtually identical to that in the 2011 AV referendum. 5 Gigerenzer illustrates this point with an amusing story. A decision theorist from Columbia University was struggling whether to accept a job offer from another university. His colleague advised him to maximise his utility, something which he regularly wrote about in his research. The decision theorist responded: 'Come on, this is serious ' (2008: 20) . 9 These items were included in the second wave of the survey for space reasons. 10 The statements in the tables are summaries. Actual question wording may be obtained from the survey questionnaires which may be downloaded from the BES website cited in note 2. The website also has a measurement appendix which discusses details of the construction of all the variables used in the analyses in this paper. The survey data are available on the website for replication purposes and secondary analyses by BES user communities. 11 The democracy and traditionalism factors explain 26.6 per cent and 25.1 per cent of the item variance, respectively.
12 England is reference category. 13 The simulations were performed using the Clarify programme available from Gary King's website at Harvard University (http://gking.harvard.edu). See Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2003) .
